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Introduction 
Developing efficient and sound financial systems is a key ingredient in successful 
growth strategies, particularly in low and middle-income countries. Modern financial 
economics focus on market failures arising from information asymmetries and 
transaction costs and suggest that financial development will improve the allocation of 
capital and thus accelerate economic growth by mitigating these sources of market 
failures. A large body of literature shows that development of financial sector1 support 
economic growth (See the recent survey by Valickova et al., 2015). Figure 0.1. 
illustrates the development of average share of domestic credit to private sector by GDP.  
The average domestic credit to private sector is computed as a weighted average of 
individual country‘s GDP per capital. Since 2006, the share of private domestic credit in 
high income countries has tended to decline, from 124% in 2006 to 99% in 2014. By 
contrast, the share of private domestic credit in low and lower middle countries has 
increased from 19.9% in 2001 to 35% in 2014. Apparently, High income counties and 
low income counties have a great difference in the expansion path of financial 
development. This indicates the heterogeneity on the effect of financial development. 
 
Fig.0.1. Average domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). Average share is 
computed as a weighted average of individual country shares according to time 
variant GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$). Data source is Word Bank Database. 
 
                                                 
1
 The World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) developed four sets of proxy 
variables to measure financial development worldwide. These are financial depth, access, efficiency, 
and stability. 
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Two deficiencies are evident in previous literature. First, less analysis has been done 
to empirically examine the relationship between financial development and income 
inequality and the existing studies provide at best mixed evidence. Some argue that 
financial development will reduce income inequality because it expands economic 
opportunities for the poor by easing their external financing constraints due to the lack 
of collateral, credit histories and connections (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and 
Zeria, 1993; Aghion and Boltion, 1997; Galor and Mova, 2004). By contrast, others 
argue that the rich and well-connected can disproportionally benefit from financial 
development at early stages of development, particularly under the poor quality of 
governance (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Chapter 1 
contributes to the literature by distinguishing between long-run and short-run effects of 
financial development on income inequality and presenting evidence that financial 
development can have different and even contradicting effects on inequality depending 
on the time horizon. This chapter also finds that the observed adverse short-run effects 
of financial development are associated with the vulnerabilities of countries in terms of 
their susceptibility to crises and quality of governance.  
Another deficiency is that financial development and financial openness nexus has 
not been fully taken into account in previous studies. Being different from the prior 
studies that emphasized the role of institutions and laws, I focus on the degree of 
banking competition as key determinant of cross-country heterogeneity. I measure the 
degree of banking competition using the Boone indicator, which gives the elasticity of 
profits to marginal costs; the more negative the figure is, the higher the degree of 
competition in the banking sector. The indicator is based on the hypothesis that more 
efficient banks (i.e., those with lower marginal costs) earn greater profits or higher 
market shares (the efficient structure hypothesis). Chapter 2 examines the dynamic 
relationship between financial development and financial openness using the pooled 
mean group estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). The results show that 
financial openness has a positive effect on financial development in the long run, but 
may have a negative effect in the short run. Using estimates of country-specific 
short-run coefficients, I also find that the adverse short-run effects of financial openness 
are associated with a lower degree of banking competition. The system generalized 
method of momentums (GMM) estimator also supports these findings, suggesting that 
the financial development and financial openness nexus is contingent on the degree of 
banking competition. A key policy implication is that a higher degree of banking 
competition is a precondition for financial openness to promote financial development.  
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On the other hand, financial innovation is a double-edged sword. The crisis has 
challenged traditional thinking in financial sector policies and sparked debates on how 
best to achieve sustainable development. The recent global financial crisis has 
stimulated empirical research focusing on financial stress shocks (See the recent survey 
by Kevin et al., 2012).  
Figure 0.2 illustrates the movement of KCFSI. It suggests that during 2008 financial 
market experienced a high degree financial stress. The KCFSI is a composite index 
designed to measure the level of stress in US financial markets. It includes 11 financial 
variables such as TED spread, Treasury and corporate bond spreads, and the volatility of 
stock prices.
2
 Assuming that US financial market conditions reflect, to a significant 
degree, the overall conditions in global financial markets, the KCFSI provides a 
reasonable measure of stress in global financial markets. It has previously been 
demonstrated that an increase in financial stress is associated with higher financing 
costs, greater economic uncertainty, and increased risk premiums, resulting in depressed 
corporate investment and household spending and declining real economic activity 
(Hakkio and Keeton, 2009; Davig and Hakkio, 2010).  
 
Fig.0.2. The Kansas city financial stress index from 1990 to 2015.Data is 
available from https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/indicatorsdata/kcfsi/ 
                                                 
2
 The KCFSI includes the following 11 variables: 3-month TED spread, 2-year swap spread, 
off-the-run/on-the-run 10-year Treasury spread, Aaa/10-year Treasury spread, Baa/Aaa spread, 
high-yield bond/Baa spread, consumer ABS/5-year Treasury spread, the correlation between stock 
and Treasury returns, the implied volatility of overall stock prices, the idiosyncratic volatility of bank 
stock prices, and the cross-sectional dispersion of bank stock returns. See Hakkio and Keeton (2009) 
for details on the KCFSI. The data are available on a monthly basis from the early 1990s until 
recently and they can be downloadedat http://www.kc.frb.org/research/indicatorsdata/kcfsi/. 
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Against the background, Chapter 3 extends Kilian‘s (2009) framework to identify an 
exogenous shock arising from changes in financial market conditions and examine the 
consequent macroeconomic impacts of oil price changes. I find that a financial shock is 
a key determinant of oil prices and its macroeconomic impact is as important as the 
impact of other underlying shocks. The results indicate that policymakers must 
explicitly consider changes in financial market conditions when analyzing the impacts 
of oil shocks. Further, a stabilization policy must be forward-looking and tailored to 
underlying causes because different shocks have different impacts at different time 
horizons. 
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Chapter 1 
Financial Development and Income Inequality: Long-Run 
Relationship and Short-Run Heterogeneity 
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1.1 Introduction 
Developing efficient and sound financial systems is a key ingredient in successful 
growth strategies, particularly in low and middle-income countries. Modern financial 
economics focus on market failures arising from information asymmetries and 
transaction costs and suggest that financial development will improve the allocation of 
capital and thus accelerate economic growth by mitigating these sources of market 
failures. Since the seminal work by King and Levine (1993), there has been a large 
accumulation of empirical evidence that financial development accelerates long-run 
economic growth (see the survey by Levine, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2008).  
However, less analysis has been done to empirically examine the relationship 
between financial development and income inequality and the existing studies provide 
at best mixed evidence. Clark et al. (2006) examine the relationship between financial 
development and income inequality for 83 countries over the period 1960-1995 and find 
that, in the long run, inequality is less when financial development is greater. Beck et al. 
(2007) use data for 72 countries over the period 1996-2005 and show that financial 
development disproportionally increases income of the poor and thus reduce income 
inequality. Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012) use the panel data of 126 countries for the 
period 1963-2002 and find that financial development reduces inequality but economic 
growth weakens this equalizing effect of financial development. Inoue and Hamori 
(2013) use the state-level panel data of India and present evidence that financial 
development reduce poverty rates both in urban and rural areas. Hermes (2014) uses the 
cross-section data of 70 developing countries and shows that higher levels of 
microfinance participation are associated with a reduction of the income gap between 
rich and poor people. 
   By contrast, Roine et al. (2009) use a panel data of OECD 16 countries over the 
entire twentieth century and find evidence that financial development is pro-rich and the 
effect is strongest at relatively low levels of economic development. Gimet and 
Lagoarde-Segot (2011) use a panel Bayesian structural vector autoregressive model for 
49 countries over the period 1994-2002 and show that financial development measured 
in terms of banking credit tends to increase income inequality. Using the same data set 
as Beck et al. (2007), Kim and Lin (2011) estimate a threshold regression model to 
examine whether there is nonlinear relationship between financial development and 
inequality. They find that financial development reduces income inequality only when 
the country reaches a threshold level of financial development and below this critical 
level, financial development increases inequality.    
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   Although these studies tend to focus on the long-run relationship between financial 
development and income inequality, financial development could have different 
economic effects depending on the time horizon. For example, a stable and sustained 
growth in banking credit will accelerate economic growth in the long run while rapid 
and excessive credit expansions can induce financial crises in the short run
3
. In fact, 
Loayza and Rancière (2006) find evidence that financial development accelerates 
economic growth in the long run while decelerating it in the short run. It is equally 
possible that financial development could have contradicting effects on income 
inequality depending on the time horizon. 
However, to our best knowledge, none of the existing studies explicitly distinguish 
between long-run and short-run effects of financial development on income inequality. 
To fill this gap in the literature, this paper examines the dynamic relationship between 
financial development and inequality using a panel error-correction model, in which 
both long-run and short-run effects are estimated jointly from autoregressive 
distributed-lag (ARDL) models. To estimate the model, we use the pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). The major advantage of the PMG 
estimator is that it addresses the possible cross-country heterogeneity in parameters by 
allowing the short-run coefficients to be different while restricting the long-run 
coefficient to be the same across countries. Moreover, the estimates of country-specific 
short-run coefficients allow us to examine the cross-country pattern of variations in 
short-term coefficients. We speculate that cross-country heterogeneity in short-term 
effects is associated with the vulnerabilities of countries in terms of their susceptibility 
to financial crises and quality of governance. To verify this claim, we statistically 
examine the relationship between the measures of these vulnerabilities and the 
country-specific short-run coefficients.   
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the econometric 
methodology and data. Section 1.3 presents estimation results. Section 1.4 examines the 
vulnerabilities of countries associated with heterogeneous short-run effects. Section 1.5 
provides summary and conclusions. 
1.2 Econometric Methodology and Data 
When estimating a panel model with a large group of countries, heterogeneity in 
parameters across countries can be a problem. There are broadly three approaches to 
                                                 
3
 The empirical evidence indicates that a rapid and excessive growth in domestic credit is one of the 
most common factors associated with financial crises. See Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); IMF (2004).  
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estimating a dynamic panel model with possible cross-country heterogeneity. One 
approach assumes fully heterogeneous parameters across countries and thus imposes no 
cross-country restriction. The mean group (MG) estimator developed by Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) can be used for this case of full heterogeneity. The MG estimator provides 
consistent parameter estimates of cross-country mean by taking the average of 
individually estimated parameters. Another approach assumes that the slope coefficients 
are identical across countries but the intercepts can differ between countries. One of the 
most popular methods used in this approach is the generalized method of momentum 
(GMM) for dynamic panel models, which is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Arellano and Bover (1995). For example, Beck et al. (2007), Hamori and 
Hashiguchi (2012), and Inoue and Hamori (2013) use the GMM estimator to examine 
the effect of financial development on income inequality and poverty rates.  
The third approach distinguishes between long-run and short-run effects and 
assumes that the latter is country-specific while the former is common across countries. 
This paper employs this approach and estimates a panel error-correction model using 
the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). The PMG estimator allows the 
short-run slope coefficient and intercepts to be heterogeneous while restricting the 
long-run coefficient to be the homogeneous across countries. It also provides consistent 
estimates of the cross-country mean of short-run coefficients by taking the average of 
estimated individual coefficients. By comparing the estimated country-specific 
short-run coefficients, the PMG estimator allows us to examine the cross-country 
pattern of variations in estimated short-run coefficients. Our estimation strategy is 
closely correlated with that of Loayza and Rancière (2006), which uses the PMG 
estimator to examine the long-run and short-run relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. 
The estimation procedure for PMG estimator can be described briefly as follows. 
Suppose that the dynamic relationship between income inequality and its determinant is 
given by the following autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) (p,q) model: 
, ,
1 0
p q
it ij i t j ij i t j i it
j j
y y x    
 
                   (1.1) 
where ity  is the measure of income inequality; itx  represents a set of explanatory 
variables, including the measure of financial development and control variables; i  is 
the fixed effect; 
ij  and ij  are the coefficients; it  is the time-varying disturbance; 
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and the subscript i and t represents country and time, respectively. Eq. (1.1) can be 
re-parameterized as an error-correction form: 
          
1 1
, 1 , , ,
1 0
( )
p q
it i i t i i t ij i t j ij i t j i it
j j
y y x y x     
 
  
 
                    (1.2)   
where 
i  is the coefficient on the error correction term; i  is the long-run coefficient; 
and 
ij  and ij  are the short-run coefficients. The PMG estimator is obtained by 
restricting the long-run coefficients, 
i , to be common across countries. The maximum 
likelihood method is used for the estimation. Pesaran et al. (1999) show that under 
certain regularity conditions, the PMG estimators are consistent and asymptotically 
normal regardless of whether regressors are I(0) or I(1). Once the estimates of short-run 
coefficients for individual countries are obtained, consistent estimates of cross-country 
mean of these parameters are given by  
 
 
1
1
/      1.3
/  1.    4
N
Mj ij
i
N
Mj ij
i
N
N
 
 






 
where N represents the number of countries. 
Our panel data set consists of 88 countries with annual data for the period 1961- 
2012. The list of countries in the sample is provided in Appendix A. The level of income 
inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient taken from Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) Version 4.0
4
. Following the existing studies, notably Beck 
et al. (2007), we measure financial development by private domestic credit as a 
percentage of GDP. Private credit is the claims on private sectors by financial 
intermediaries. The control variables include income levels, trade openness, and 
inflation rates. We control for income levels because financial development can 
influence income inequality by affecting economic growth and thus income levels 
(Beck et al., 2007). Assuming that income levels are negatively correlated with 
subsequent economic growth due to convergence effects, we anticipate that income 
inequality is negatively correlated with income levels through its positive correlation 
with economic growth
5
. Higher inflation rates can increase income inequality because 
the rich has more access to financial instruments that can hedge the exposure to inflation 
                                                 
4
 The data can be downloaded at: http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html  
5
 Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012) find that inequality is negatively correlated with income levels, 
while Inoue and Hamori (2013) find that inequality is positively correlated with economic growth.  
10 
 
while the poor has limited access to such instruments and instead holds more cash 
(Easterly and Fischer, 2001; Erosa and Gustavo, 2002). The impact of trade openness on 
income inequality is ambiguous, though there is some evidence that greater openness 
increases inequality (Ravallion, 2001; Wagle, 2007; Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012). The 
income level is measured by the log of GDP per capita. Trade openness is measured by 
the sum of export and import as a percentage of GDP. The inflation rate is measured by 
the annual changes of GDP deflator. The data source for these variables is World Bank 
World Development Indicators.     
1.3 Estimation Results  
Table 1.1 shows the results obtained with PMG estimator in comparison with those with 
the MG estimator. Since one of our purposes is to examine cross-country variations in 
short-run coefficients, we impose common lag structures across countries. The 
maximum lag of one is chosen for all variables to preserve the degrees of freedom
6
. A 
lag of one is consistent with the existing studies that use the dynamic panel GMM 
model with the specification of one lag for the dependent variable (see, among others, 
Beck et al. 2007; Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Inoue and Hamori, 2013). The 
Hausman test indicates that the null hypothesis of homogeneous long-run coefficients 
cannot be rejected jointly for all parameters, as well as for individual ones. We therefore 
focus on the results of the PMG estimator below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Note that adding one lag increases the number of short-run coefficients by 80 for each explanatory 
variable.   
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Table 1.1 
The long- and short-run effect of financial development on income equality 
 PMG MG Hausman tests 
Variable Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error h-test p-value 
Long-run coefficients 
Financial development -0.0953  0.0093  0.7026  0.6323  0.6587  0.4170 
Income levels 3.9614  0.6959 -34.871  21.137  1.3965  0.2373 
Trade openness  0.0424  0.0079 -0.0327  0.1535  0.0990  0.7530 
Inflation rate  0.0042  0.0009 -0.0503  0.3360  0.0109  0.9168 
   Joint Hausman test:  1.6600  0.7984 
Error-correction coefficients -0.0895  0.0167 -0.2633  0.0254   
Short-run coefficients       
  Financial development  0.0311  0.0112  0.0080  0.0189   
  Income levels  0.6546  1.2015  0.3540  1.4960   
  Trade openness -0.0100  0.0068 -0.0093  0.0087   
  Inflation rate -0.0057  0.0046  0.0132  0.0099   
Intercept  0.5840  0.2165  7.1256  6.3351   
 
The estimates of long-run coefficients on all control variables are positive and 
statistically significant, which indicate that higher income levels, greater trade openness, 
and higher inflation rates are all associated with increased income inequality in the long 
run. By contrast, the long-run coefficient on financial development is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that financial development is associated with less 
income inequality in the long run
7
. The result is consistent with the previous findings by 
Clarke et al. (2006), Beck et al. (2007), Hamori and Hashiguchi (2012), and Inoue and 
Hamori (2013).   
By contrast, the estimates of short-run coefficients indicate that financial 
development is associated with more income inequality in the short run. While the 
estimates of country-specific short-run coefficients on financial development are 
heterogeneous as shown in Figure 1.1, the mean of these coefficients is positive and 
statistically significant. Note that none of the means of short-run coefficients on control 
variables is statistically significant. The contrast between the long-run and short-run 
                                                 
7
 As a robustness check we use M2 as a ratio to GDP as an alternative measure of financial 
intermediation and find that its long-run coefficient is negative. We also find that the mean of its 
short-run coefficients is positive, but the short-run coefficient is only marginally significant at 
10%-significance level.       
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effects and the cross-country heterogeneity in the latter provide rationale for using the 
PMG estimator.  
 
Fig.1.1. Frequency distributions of short-run coefficients 
 
The estimated coefficient on error-correction terms is statistically highly significant 
and correctly signed. However, the relatively small size of coefficient implies that it 
takes a long time for the equation to return to its long-run equilibrium once it is shocked. 
The slow speed of adjustments underlies the importance of distinguishing between 
long-run and short-run effects and thus provides another rationale for using the PMG 
estimator.  
In sum, the above estimation results indicate that the effect of financial development 
on income inequality can be different and even contradicting depending on the time 
horizon. More specifically, we find that financial development reduces income 
inequality in the long run while it tends to increase inequality in the short run
8
.   
 
1.4 Vulnerabilities Associated with Heterogeneous Short-Run Effects  
                                                 
8
 Strictly speaking, the causality could run in the reverse direction and thus income inequality might 
affect financial development. However, there is no plausible explanation for the contracting effect 
that income inequality promotes financial development in the long run, while reversing it in the short 
run. Hence, we interpret our estimation results to indicate the causality running from financial 
development to income inequality.     
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So what could be the reasons for the adverse effect of financial development on income 
inequality in the short run? To address this question, we utilize the estimates of 
country-specific short-run coefficients on financial development. Following Loayza and 
Rancière (2006), we examine the vulnerabilities of countries that might be associated 
with the adverse short-run effects of financial development. By doing so, we seek to 
provide possible explanations for why financial development can increase income 
inequality in certain countries. In this paper, we examine two types of vulnerabilities 
that are widely observed in low and middle-income countries. The first one is the 
susceptibility to financial crises. Empirical evidence indicates that credit booms in the 
aftermath of financial liberalization are common factors associated with financial crises, 
particularly under weak regulatory environments
9
. Loayza and Rancière (2006) focus on 
this vulnerability and find evidence that the susceptibility to crises measured by crisis 
frequency is associated with the adverse effects of financial development on short-run 
economic growth. It is equally possible that susceptibility to crises is associated with 
adverse effects of financial development on income inequality in the short run. We 
measure the susceptibility to crises by the number of crises that countries experienced 
for the period 1970-2012. The data source is Laeven and Valencia (2012). 
Another vulnerability that might be associated with adverse effects of financial 
development on inequality is the quality of governance. There is growing evidence that 
good governance will not only accelerate economic growth but also reduce income 
inequality through providing better education, social safety nets, and infrastructure 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Rodrik and Subramania, 2004; Rodrik, 2008). 
Furthermore, a robust framework of financial regulations and supervision underpinned 
by good governance will help to prevent severe financial crises, which are likely to hurt 
the poor most. We therefore predict that good governance is inversely associated with 
the adverse short-run effects of financial development on inequality because financial 
development will more likely to bring the benefits of faster growth and more jobs to the 
poor under good governance. The quality of governance is measured using the World 
Bank Governance Indicators. There are six types of governance indicators: government 
effectiveness, control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, 
rule of law, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability (see Appendix B for more 
details). We estimate the first principal component of these six indicators for the period 
                                                 
9
 See the literature in footnote 1.  
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1996-2012 and use each country‘s time average as the measure of the quality of 
governance
10
.   
Table 1.2 shows the correlation coefficients with the estimated short-run coefficients 
on financial development both for the frequency of crises and the quality of governance. 
As expected, both the simple and rank correlations are positive for the crisis frequency 
while they are negative for the governance quality. Although the correlation with the 
crisis frequency is not statistically significant at 5%-significance level based on the 
simple correlation, it is significant when measured by the rank correlation. For the 
governance quality, both the simple and rank correlations are statistically highly 
significant. In addition, their values are -0.35 and -0.33, respectively, which are 
meaningfully large enough. These results indicate that both greater susceptibility to 
crises and poor quality of governance are associated with adverse short-run effects of 
financial development on income inequality.  
 
Table 1.2 
Correlations with short-run coefficients on financial development 
for the frequency of crises and the quality of governance 
 Crisis frequency Quality of governance 
Standard correlation  0.1662 (0.1218) -0.3476 (0.0009) 
Rank correlation 0.2671 (0.0119) -0.3280 (0.0018) 
Note: p-values reported in parenthesis. 
 
We next examine whether there is difference in the mean of short-run coefficients 
between countries with high crisis frequency and those with low frequency, as well as 
between countries with good governance and those with poor governance. We split the 
sample into these two subsamples using the median of the number of crises and the 
value of the governance indicators, respectively. Table 1.3 shows the means of short-run 
coefficients for each subsample and the results of t-tests for the significance of their 
differences. When we divide the sample according to crisis frequency, the mean of 
short-run coefficients for countries with high crisis frequency is positive while that for 
low frequency countries is negative. The t-tests indicate that the difference in the mean 
of short-run coefficients between the two subsamples is statistically highly significant. 
As for the subsamples divided by governance quality, we find that the mean of short-run 
                                                 
10
 The eigenvalue indicates that the first principal component accounts for nearly 90% of total 
variance, providing reasonable summary of individual indicators.  
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coefficients is negative for countries with good governance while it is positive for those 
with poor governance. The t-tests indicate that the difference in the mean of short-run 
coefficients between the two subsamples is statistically highly significant. These results 
are consistent with those of the correlation analyses above.  
 
Table 1.3 
Test of difference in means of short-run coefficients between the subsamples 
(a) Low crisis frequency vs. high crisis frequency  
 Mean short-run 
coefficients 
Std. Error No. Obs. 
Low crisis frequency -0.0078 0.0897 31 
High crisis frequency 0.0523 0.1081 57 
Test of difference in mean  Ho: Diff=0 vs Ha: Diff≠0 
Method Diff t-value p-value 
t-test 0.0601 2.6372 0.0099 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 0.0601 2.7870 0.0068 
 
(b) Good governance vs. poor governance 
 Mean short-run 
coefficients 
Std. Error No. Obs. 
Good governance -0.0070 0.0595 44 
Poor governance 0.0693 0.1264 44 
Test of difference in mean  Ho: Diff=0 vs Ha: Diff≠0 
Method Diff t-value p-value 
t-test 0.0763 -3.6197 0.0005 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test* 0.0763 -3.6197 0.0006 
*Welch (1947) 
 
Finally, we examine whether there is visible differences in the frequency distribution 
of short-run coefficients between the two subsamples. Figure 1.2(a) and (b) show the 
frequency distributions for each subsample divided by crisis frequency and governance 
quality, respectively. We can see that the mean of short-run coefficients represented by 
the vertical line for each distribution is negative for countries with low crisis frequency 
and good governance while it is positive for countries with high crisis frequency and 
poor governance. It is also noteworthy that countries with poor governance have more 
dispersed distribution and fat tails, particularly towards the positive part of the 
spectrum.   
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Fig.1.2. Frequency distributions for each subsample 
In sum, the statistical evidence indicates that greater susceptibility to crises and poor 
quality of governance are associated with adverse short-run effects of financial 
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development on income inequality. These two vulnerabilities, which are widely 
observed in low and middle-income countries, could prevent financial development 
from delivering economic benefits to the poor in the short run
11
.          
1.5 Conclusions 
Since the seminal work by King and Levine (1993), there has been a large accumulation 
of evidence that financial development accelerates long-run economic growth. By 
comparison, less analysis has been done to empirically examine the relationship 
between financial development and income inequality and the existing studies provide 
mixed results. To derive the long-run and short-run relationship between financial 
development and income inequality, we use the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran et 
al. (1999). The PMG estimator addresses the problem of cross-country heterogeneity in 
parameters by allowing the short-run coefficients to be different while restricting the 
long-run coefficients to be the same across countries. By comparing the estimated 
country-specific short-run coefficients, the PMG estimator allows us to examine the 
cross-country pattern of variations in short-run coefficients.  
We find that the estimate of long-run coefficient on financial development is 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that financial development will reduce 
income inequality in the long run. By contrast, the mean of the estimated short-run 
coefficients is positive and statistically significant, indicating that financial development 
can increase inequality in the short run. To explore the reason for why financial 
development can increase inequality in the short run, we examine the vulnerabilities of 
countries that might be associated with the adverse effects of financial development. 
Focusing on countries‘ susceptibility to crises and quality of governance, we examine 
how these vulnerabilities are associated with the estimates of country-specific short-run 
coefficients on financial development. The statistical evidence indicates that these 
vulnerabilities are associated with the adverse short-run effects of financial development 
on inequality.  
The key policy implications derived from the analysis can be summarized as 
follows: First, despite the long-run benefits of reduced income inequality, the adverse 
short-run effects of financial development could be a major political obstacle to its 
promotion. To mitigate the possible short-run adverse effects, social safety nets need to 
                                                 
11
 We assume that the quality of governance is constant in the short run because both institutional 
reforms and capacity building take a long time for the governance to improve. However, the quality 
of governance is likely to improve in the long run as financial development accelerates economic 
growth and thus promotes necessary institutional reforms and capacity building.   
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be improved simultaneously. Second, the evidence indicates that good governance is a 
prerequisite for successful financial development. Hence, countries aimed at achieving 
inclusive economic growth through financial development are required to make serious 
efforts towards better governance. 
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Appendix 1.A: List of 88 Countries 
Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Czech Rep., Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Salvador, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Hong Kong SAR China, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Latvia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Russian, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, Vietnam, Zambia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
20 
 
Appendix 1.B 
Definitions of governance indicators  
1. Government Effectiveness Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
2. Control of Corruption Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
3. Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism captures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
4. Rule of Law Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
5. Regulatory Quality Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
6. Voice and Accountability Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to 
which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (available at: www.govindicators.org) 
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Chapter 2 
Financial Development and Financial Openness Nexus: The 
Precondition of Banking Competition 
 
 
 
  
22 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The pivotal role of financial development in economic development and poverty 
alleviation is widely accepted. For instance, many studies show that financial 
development fosters economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Jayaratne and Strahan, 
1996; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Levine et al., 2000; Loayza and Rancière, 2006). 
Others find that it expands economic opportunities for the poor by easing their external 
financing constraints (that stem from lack of collateral, credit history, or connections) 
and thus reduces income inequality (Aghion and Boltion, 1997; Galor and Mova, 2004).  
The significant impacts of financial development have led researchers to explore its 
determinants, particularly financial openness, which provides greater opportunities for 
portfolio diversification and access to overseas funds
12
. Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
explore the issue from the perspective of incumbent industrialists and financiers and 
hypothesize that the simultaneous expansion of trade and financial openness is crucial 
for financial development. Baltagi et al. (2009), however, argue that the expansion of 
even one of them (trade or financial openness) can still accelerate the development of 
the banking sector. Hauner et al. (2013) examine Rajan and Zingales‘ (2003) interest 
group theory of financial development and find that trade liberalization is a leading 
indicator of domestic financial liberalization; however, they do not find consistent 
evidence that financial openness leads to financial development. 
Additionally, many researchers explore the underlying cross-country heterogeneity. 
Chinn and Ito (2002) examine the empirical relationship between capital controls and 
the development of credit and equity markets, and suggest that they are linked, with the 
strength of the relationship based on the empirical methodology used and the level of 
development. Klein and Olivei (2008) argue that countries with open capital accounts 
have significantly greater financial depth than those with capital account restrictions. 
However, note that no link has been observed between financial openness and financial 
development in developing countries. Law and Azman-Saini (2012) reveal that 
institutional quality contributes to stock market development only when a threshold 
level of institutional development has been attained. They further find that financial 
openness has a negative impact on private sector credit. Fischer and Valenzuela (2013) 
find that financial openness has a positive effect on private credit in economies with 
competitive banking sectors and that this effect may dissipate and even become negative 
in economies with imperfect banking competition.  
                                                 
12
 Some theories suggest that capital account liberalization allows domestic and foreign investors to 
engage in greater portfolio diversification (Stulz, 1999; Henry, 2000). 
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One potential reason for these inconclusive results is that most of the existing 
studies do not explicitly distinguish between the long- and short-run effects of financial 
openness on financial development. As discussed above, financial openness could 
promote financial development in the long run, but the literature on financial fragility 
shows that financial liberalization raises the risk of financial instability in the short run 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000; Dell‘Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). Another 
potential reason is that financial openness has an impact only under certain conditions, 
such as the sophistication of institutional quality and competitiveness of financial 
sectors. Cross-country heterogeneity in these aspects could explain the mixed evidence 
on the financial development and financial openness (FD-FO) nexus. 
In light of these potential problems, we attempt to contribute to the literature by 
employing the following empirical strategies: First, we explicitly distinguish between 
the long- and short-run effects of financial openness on financial development. To this 
end, we utilize the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. 
(1999)
13
. The major advantage of this approach is that it addresses the possible 
cross-country heterogeneity in parameters by allowing different short-run coefficients 
but requiring the same long-run coefficient across countries. It is conceivable that 
openness can fully promote financial development only when the domestic financial 
systems are efficient and thus sophisticated enough to gain from greater cross-border 
opportunities. Therefore, we can expect long-run convergence in the effect of financial 
openness only among countries achieving the threshold level of domestic efficiency. We 
test this hypothesis using the PMG estimator. Second, unlike prior studies that 
emphasized the role of institutions and laws, we focus on the degree of banking 
competition as key determinant of cross-country heterogeneity. Focusing on the banking 
sector can be justified because banks play a key role in financial intermediation not only 
in developing countries, but in many advanced countries as well. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the long- and 
short-run effects of financial openness on financial development using the PMG 
estimator. In Section 3, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation 
to study the role of banking competition in the FD-FO nexus. Section 4 presents our 
conclusions. 
2.2 The Long-Run Relationship and Short-Run Heterogeneity of the FD-FO Nexus 
                                                 
13
 The PMG approach has been widely applied to the study of financial empirical research. 
Examples include Loayza and Rancière (2006), Kim et al. (2012), and Boubaker and Jouini (2014). 
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2.2.1 Methodology and Data 
Our estimation strategy largely follows that of Loayza and Rancière (2006), who use the 
PMG estimator to examine the long- and short-run relationships between financial 
development and economic growth. PMG estimation can briefly be described as 
follows: Assume that the dynamic relationship between financial development and its 
determinants is given by the following autoregressive distributed lag (p, q) model: 
                (2.1) 
where  is the measure of financial development, represents a set of explanatory 
variables (including a measure of financial openness and control variables),  is the 
fixed effect,  and  are coefficients,  is the time-varying disturbance, and 
subscripts i and t represent the country and time, respectively.  
Eq. (2.1) can be re-parameterized as an error-correction model as follows: 
          (2.2) 
where  is the coefficient on the error correction term,  is the long-run coefficient, 
and  and  are short-run coefficients. The PMG estimator is obtained by 
restricting the long-run coefficient, , so that it is the same for every country. 
Thereafter, the maximum-likelihood method is used for estimation. Pesaran et al. (1999) 
show that under certain regularity conditions, PMG estimators are consistent and 
asymptotically normal, regardless of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1).  
Our panel data set covers 70 countries with annual data from 1980 to 2011
14
 (for 
the complete list of countries in the sample, see Appendix A). We use private domestic 
credit and M2 (as a share of GDP) as proxies for level of financial development. The 
level of financial openness is measured using the de facto index proposed by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The de facto measure of financial globalization is defined as the 
sum of a country‘s foreign assets and liabilities (as a share of GDP). Income levels, 
trade openness, and inflation rates are all included as control variables
15
. The data 
                                                 
14
 Unlike other studies that typically average their data over a number of year horizons (Chinn and 
Ito, 2006), we follow the example of Baltagi et al. (2009) and use annual data to maximize the 
sample size and identify the parameters with greater precision. 
15
 The income level is measured using the log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$). We measure 
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source for these variables is the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators. 
2.2.2 Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Analysis Estimation Results 
Table 2.1 shows the results obtained from PMG estimation, which measures financial 
development in terms of private domestic credit (as a share of GDP). Since we seek to 
examine the cross-country variations in the short-run coefficients, we impose common 
lag structures across the countries. To preserve a degree of freedom, we chose a 
maximum lag of 1 for all of the variables
16
. A lag of 1 is consistent with the existing 
studies that use the dynamic panel GMM model with 1 lag on the dependent variable 
(Beck et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2010; Inoue and Hamori, 2013). The Hausman test 
indicates that the null hypothesis of homogeneous long-run coefficients cannot be 
rejected for all parameters jointly, as well as for individual ones. We therefore focus on 
the PMG estimation results shown in Table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
trade openness as the sum of exports and imports (as a share of GDP). The inflation rate is measured 
by the annual percentage changes in GDP deflator divided by 100. 
16
 It should be noted that adding 1 lag increases the number of short-run coefficients by 70 for each 
explanatory variable. 
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Table 2.1 
The results of PMG estimation (FD measured by private domestic credit/GDP) 
 PMG MG Hausman test 
Long-run coefficients 
Financial openness 0.1859*** 
(0.0243) 
-0.0434 
(0.1810) 
0.7565 
[0.3844] 
Income levels 0.1531*** 
(0.0296) 
0.6731** 
(0.3047) 
1.3669 
[0.2423] 
Trade openness 0.1984*** 
(0.0417) 
-0.1968 
(0.1880) 
2.1127 
[0.1461] 
Inflation rate -0.0041 
(0.0028) 
0.2365 
(0.9065) 
0.0329 
[0.8561] 
  Joint Hausman test: 5.9600 
[0.2021] 
Error-correction coefficients -0.0914*** 
(0.0137) 
-0.3129*** 
(0.0269) 
 
Short-run coefficients 
 Financial openness -0.0633** 
(0.0309) 
-0.0256 
(0.0223) 
 
Income levels 0.0456 
(0.0684) 
-0.2004** 
(0.0868) 
 
 Trade openness -0.0922 
(0.0577) 
-0.0026 
(0.0653) 
 
 Inflation rate -0.1122 
(0.0895) 
-0.3115** 
(0.1415) 
 
Intercept -0.0627*** 
(0.0128) 
-1.9225*** 
(0.4339) 
 
Notes 
1. The values in parentheses are the standard errors of corresponding estimates.  
2. The values in brackets are the p-values of the Hausman test.  
3. *,** and, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The long-run coefficient on financial openness is positive and statistically significant; 
this result is consistent with the findings of previous studies. However, estimates of the 
short-run coefficient indicate that financial openness has a statistically significant 
negative impact on financial development. One possible explanation for this negative 
effect is the absence of efficient and deep domestic financial systems that benefit from 
greater financial openness without being destabilized by volatile short-run capital flows. 
As a number of emerging market crises have shown, the combination of premature 




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financial openness and inefficient and shallow domestic financial systems can lead to 
serious financial crises. As for the control variables, the long-run coefficients on the 
income level and trade openness are positive and statistically significant.  
To see whether our results are sensitive to the measurement methodology used, we 
explore an alternative financial development measure (M2 as a share of GDP) and find 
the results (see Table 2.2) largely similar to those in Table 2.1 (which is based on the 
measure by private domestic credit as a share of GDP). Using the M2 indicator, we find 
that financial openness has a negative impact on financial development in the short run; 
however, this is not statistically significant. We also find that the long-run coefficient on 
the inflation rate is negative and significant. It is also worth mentioning that the 
short-term effect of trade openness on financial development is negative and statistically 
significant. This result is quite similar to Kim et al.‘s (2010) findings of a positive 
long-run relationship between trade openness and financial development coexisting with 
a negative short-run relationship. 
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Table 2.2 
The results of PMG estimation (FD measured by M2/GDP) 
 PMG MG Hausman test 
Long-run coefficients 
Financial openness 0.0997** 
(0.0398) 
-0.2637 
(0.2446) 
1.0411 
[0.3076] 
Income levels 0.3939*** 
(0.0480) 
1.0129** 
(0.4772) 
0.7871 
[0.3750] 
Trade openness 1.2456*** 
(0.1199) 
0.3695 
(0.3001) 
4.2877 
[0.0384] 
Inflation rate -2.6078*** 
(0.3062) 
-2.7447* 
(1.6240) 
0.0580 
[0.8097] 
  Joint Hausman test: 11.0900 
[0.0256] 
Error-correction coefficients -0.0610*** 
(0.0143) 
-0.2448*** 
(0.0649) 
 
Short-run coefficients 
 Financial openness -0.0194 
(0.0281) 
-0.0353 
(0.0340) 
 
Income levels -0.1389 
(0.1226) 
-0.2124 
(0.1750) 
 
 Trade openness -0.1572** 
(0.0609) 
-0.1718 
(0.1189) 
 
 Inflation rate -0.3661* 
(0.2173) 
0.3433 
(0.2953) 
 
Intercept -0.1772*** 
(0.0504) 
-0.4061 
(2.8744) 
 
Notes 
1. The values in parentheses are the standard errors of corresponding estimates.  
2. The values in brackets are the p-values of the Hausman test.  
3. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
2.2.3 Analysis of Short-Run Heterogeneous Effects 
In this section, we examine the possible explanation for the short-term negative effect of 
financial openness. As discussed in the Introduction section, we focus on the role of 
banking competition in financial development. We measure the degree of banking 
competition using the Boone indicator, which gives the elasticity of profits to marginal 
costs; the more negative the figure is, the higher the degree of competition in the 




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banking sector
17
. The indicator is based on the hypothesis that more efficient banks (i.e., 
those with lower marginal costs) earn greater profits or higher market shares (the 
efficient structure hypothesis). This effect is stronger when banks interact more 
aggressively. As compared to the banking concentration ratio (which is generally 
considered to be a poor proxy), the main advantage of the Boone indicator in measuring 
banking competition is that it captures the interactions between banks (Berger et al., 
2004; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Furthermore, we average this measure of 
competition over each country‘s sample period18. In so doing, we can examine whether 
a difference exists between the mean short-run coefficients of countries with a high 
degree of banking competition and those with a low degree, based on the median value 
of the countries‘ Boone indicators. Table 2.3 shows the means of short-run coefficients 
for each subsample (i.e., countries with low and high degrees of competition) and the 
t-test results for significance of their differences. The t-tests indicate that the difference 
in means between the two subsamples is highly significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The Boone indicator can be downloaded from the Word Bank Global Financial Development 
Database. This database‘s estimations of the Boone indicator follows the methodology used by 
Schaeck and Cihák (2010), except that it utilizes marginal costs instead of average costs. 
18
 The length of the period depends on availability of data. 
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Table 2.3 
Test of difference in means of short-run coefficients between the subsamples 
Low degree of banking competition vs. high degree of banking competition 
(a) FD measured by private domestic credit/GDP 
 Mean short-run 
coefficients 
Std. Error No. Obs. 
Low degree -0.1472 0.2136 35 
High degree 0.0205 0.2742 35 
Test of difference in means: Ho: Diff=0 vs. Ha: Diff≠0 
 Diff t-value p-value 
   t-test 0.1677 2.8537 0.0057 
   Satterthwaite-Welch t-test
#
 0.1677 8.1437 0.0058 
 
(b) FD measured by M2/GDP 
 Mean short-run 
coefficients 
Std. Error No. Obs. 
Low degree -0.0967 0.2681 35 
High degree 0.0579 0.1662 35 
Test of difference in mean: Ho: Diff=0 vs. Ha: Diff≠0 
 Diff t-value p-value 
   t-test 0.1546 2.8991 0.0050 
   Satterthwaite-Welch t-test
#
 0.1546 8.4047 0.0053 
#
Welch(1947)    
 
Figure 2.1 shows the frequency distributions for the subsamples. We see that the means 
of short-run coefficients, represented by vertical lines for each distribution, are positive 
for countries with a high degree of competition and negative for countries with a low 
degree. All in all, statistical evidence indicates that if a country faces low competition in 
its banking sector, its financial development is more likely to be adversely affected in 
the short run by financial openness. 
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               (a) FD measured by private domestic credit/GDP 
 
 
 
               (b) FD measured by measured by M2/GDP 
 
Fig. 2.1. Frequency distributions of short-run coefficients for subsample 
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2.3 Further Analysis Using the System GMM Estimator 
2.3.1 Methodology and Data 
To explore this topic in greater depth and gain more insight into the results obtained 
from the PMG estimation above, we employ the system GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995), and analyze the influence of 
financial openness and banking competition on financial development. Our sample for 
this analysis consists of 102 countries with annual data from 1998 to 2011 (see 
Appendix A). Compared to the previous PMG estimation, the present sample period is 
shorter because of limited availability of data on the frequency of systemic banking 
crises and the banking sector‘s probability of default. We include these variables to 
control for the possible short-run effect of financial fragility induced by liberalization. 
In contrast, the sample coverage of countries is wider because more data are available 
for all variables due to the shorter sample period
19
. In this way, we try to confirm 
whether banking competition is a precondition for financial openness in a country and 
examine the role of banking competition in financial development. For this, we add a 
cross-product term to capture the heterogeneity in impact of financial openness on 
financial development across different levels of competition in the banking sector. Since 
this approach is rather similar to the analysis of short-run heterogeneous effects using 
the PMG estimator, we extend Eq. (1) to include banking competition as follows: 
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 2 4 , 1 , 2* (2.3)it i t i t i t i t i t it t i ity y FO COMP FO COMP X                     
 
where y represents financial development (measured by private domestic credit/GDP), 
FO is financial openness (as defined above), COMP represents banking competition 
(measured by the Boone indicator), and X is a set of control variables (including the 
same basic macroeconomic variables in Eq. (1)). As noted above, we also include the 
frequency of systemic banking crises and the banking system‘s probability of default 
among the control variables in the system GMM estimator. The data source for the 
frequency of systemic banking crises is Laeven and Valencia (2012). The banking 
                                                 
19
 Despite wider coverage of countries, the number of observations in GMM estimation is 
significantly smaller than that in PMG estimation due to the shorter sample period (see Appendix B). 
Therefore, we chose to use the full sample of 102 countries in GMM estimation. We recognize that 
the difference in the structure of data set may lead to the question of comparability between the two 
estimations. However, we also note that the sample countries of PMG and GMM estimation 
respectively represent in total over 83% and 88% of the world‘s GDP (current US$) in 2011, 
indicating that our sample is reasonably comprehensive.     
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system‘s probability of default is measured using the bank Z-score indicator provided 
by the World Bank‘s World Development Indicators. Following Baltagi et al. (2009) and 
Fischer and Valenzuela (2013), we lag financial openness (FO) by one period to treat it 
as predetermined. In addition, we lag banking competition (COMP) by two periods to 
capture the effect on financial development of market structure prior to financial 
openness. This is consistent with our empirical question of whether the effect of 
financial openness depends on the precondition of degree of competitiveness in the 
banking sectors. From Eq. (3), the partial derivative of financial development with 
respect to financial openness can be expressed as 
                     (2.4) 
2.3.2 System GMM Estimator Results 
The results of the system GMM estimation presented in Table 2.4 confirm the findings 
of our previous analysis. Income level and inflation have a statistically significant 
impact on financial development, but no evidence suggests that trade openness has an 
effect. As suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003), trade openness without financial 
openness is unlikely to encourage financial development. However, our focus is on the 
roles of financial openness and banking competition in financial development, and so 
we do not include the cross-product term between financial and trade openness in our 
specification to identify such a conditional effect. PMG estimation results show that 
trade openness effect has strong short-term heterogeneity, suggesting that it is limited by 
various heterogeneity factors such as financial openness (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
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Table 2.4 The results of GMM estimation  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Financial development (lagged) 
  
1.0440*** 
(0.0274) 
0.9500*** 
(0.0511) 
0.9492*** 
(0.0509) 
Financial openness (lagged) 
  
0.0128* 
(0.0074) 
0.0145** 
(0.0072) 
0.0117* 
(0.0070) 
Banking competition (lagged by two 
  periods)   
-0.0212** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0013 
(0.0022) 
-0.0167** 
(0.0069) 
Financial openness (lagged) × Banking 
  competition (lagged by two periods)  
-0.0680*** 
(0.0246) 
 -0.0525** 
(0.0217) 
Frequency of systemic banking crises -0.0718*** 
(0.0195) 
-0.0365* 
(0.0202) 
-0.0368* 
(0.0202) 
Banking system‘s probability of default 
  
-0.0020*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
Income levels  0.0371** 
(0.0181) 
0.0369** 
(0.0183) 
Trade openness  -0.0485 
(0.0335) 
-0.0459 
(0.0338) 
Inflation rate  -0.1892*** 
(0.0234) 
-0.1899*** 
(0.0243) 
Intercept -5.8363* 
(3.1493) 
-9.4001** 
(3.8656) 
-9.3239** 
(3.8511) 
 
No.Countries /No.Observations 
 
102/1056 
 
102/1037 
 
102/1037 
 
Specification test (p-values) 
   
(a) Sargan test 0.4313 0.2424 0.2344 
(b) Serial correlation    
     First-order 0.0046 0.0096 0.0097 
     Second-order 0.1888 0.2601 0.2358 
Notes 
1. Figures in parentheses are Windmeijer (2005)-robust standard error.  
2. *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
3. Year dummies are including in all the regressions.  
              
             
We find that financial openness has a significant positive impact on financial 
development. We also find that the interaction term between financial openness and 
banking competition has a statically significant negative impact. This indicates that 
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financial openness is beneficial for financial development when the banking sector is 
competitive. Figure 2.2 plots the marginal effect of financial openness on financial 
development. In addition, we conclude that banking competition itself promotes 
financial development. We also find that financial fragility (defined as systemic banking 
crises and the probability of banking system default) deters financial development. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2. Marginal effects of financial openness on financial 
development conditional on the degree of banking competition. 
Note: The solid line represents the marginal effect. The dotted line 
represents 95% confidence intervals. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
This study constitutes a significant contribution to the literature because it distinguishes 
between the long- and short-run effects of financial openness on financial development 
and shows that these effects differ greatly. Additionally, we find that in both PMG and 
GMM estimations, the adverse short-run effects of financial openness are associated 
with the degree of competition in the individual countries‘ banking sectors. Our results 
also suggest that banking competition promotes financial development. In addition, we 
find that financial fragility has a negative effect on financial development. Thus, we can 
conclude that the key question on the relationship between financial development and 
financial openness is not whether countries stand to benefit from financial openness in 
the long run, but rather under what circumstances they benefit. Policy makers should 
note that to gain full benefit from financial openness, a country (especially a developing 
one) must have a healthy and competitive financial environment—one that renders the 
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banking sectors more efficient and thus enables them to gain from greater cross-border 
opportunities.  
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Appendix 2.A   
Sample of countries    
Country PMG estimation 
 (70 countries) 
GMM estimation 
(102 countries) 
Algeria – × 
Antigua and Barbuda – × 
Argentina × × 
Australia × × 
Austria × × 
Bahrain – × 
Bangladesh × × 
Belgium × × 
Belize – × 
Benin                × × 
Bhutan – × 
Bolivia – × 
Botswana × × 
Brazil × × 
Burundi × × 
Cameroon × × 
Canada × × 
Chile × × 
China × × 
Colombia – × 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of – × 
Costa Rica × × 
Côte d'Ivoire × × 
Cyprus × × 
Denmark – × 
Djibouti – × 
Dominican Rep. × × 
Ecuador – × 
El Salvador – × 
Ethiopia – × 
Finland × × 
France × × 
Gabon × × 
Gambia, The – × 
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Germany × × 
Ghana × × 
Greece × × 
Grenada × × 
Guatemala × × 
Guinea – × 
Haiti                – × 
Honduras × × 
India × × 
Indonesia × × 
Ireland × × 
Israel – × 
Italy × × 
Japan × × 
Jordan × × 
Kenya × × 
Korea × × 
Lesotho × × 
Libya – × 
Madagascar × × 
Malawi × × 
Malaysia × × 
Mali × × 
Malta × × 
Mauritania × × 
Mauritius – × 
Mexico × × 
Morocco × × 
Nepal × × 
Netherlands × × 
Nicaragua – × 
Niger                × × 
Nigeria × × 
Norway × × 
Oman × × 
Pakistan × × 
Panama – × 
Paraguay – × 
Peru × × 
Philippines × × 
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Portugal – × 
Rwanda – × 
Samoa – × 
Saudi Arabia – × 
Senegal × × 
Sierra Leone × × 
Singapore × × 
Spain × × 
Sri Lanka × × 
St. Kitts and Nevis – × 
Sudan × × 
Suriname – × 
Swaziland            × × 
Sweden – × 
Syrian Arab Republic × × 
Tanzania – × 
Thailand × × 
Togo                 × × 
Trinidad and Tobago × × 
Tunisia – × 
Turkey × × 
Uganda × × 
United Arab Emirates – × 
United Kingdom × × 
United States × × 
Uruguay × × 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. × × 
Zambia × × 
Note: × indicates that the country is included in the sample, while – indicates that the country is not 
included in the sample.  
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Appendix 2.B 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
(1)Dataset used in PMG estimator, 70 countries  (1980-2011) 
Private domestic 
credit/GDP 
2199 0.4835 0.4580 0.0154 2.9646 
M2/GDP 2097 0.5504 0.4508 0.0655 2.8340 
Financial openness  2238 -0.3910 0.5832 -5.4103 2.5561 
Income levels 2229 7.9831 1.6964 4.9683 11.1244 
Inflation rate 2233 0.2430 1.8263 -0.2763 50.4878 
Trade openness 2232 0.7242 0.5123 0.0632 4.3966 
 
(2) Dataset used in GMM estimator, 102 countries (1998-2011) 
Private domestic 
credit/GDP 
1393 0.5361 0.5100 0.0020 2.9646 
Financial openness  1427 -0.2730 1.2155 -3.0820 17.2070 
Boone indicator 1287 -0.0576 0.2076 -2.0820 5.9680 
Frequency of systemic 
banking crises 
1428 0.0763 0.2656 0.0000 1.0000 
Banking system‘s 
probability of default 
(z-score) 
1312 15.5694 9.8421 -11.5740 65.2840 
Income levels 1418 8.0955 1.7002 4.8715 11.1244 
Inflation rate 1421 0.0925 0.7129 -0.3281 26.3012 
Trade openness 1407 0.7920 0.4731 0.1587 4.3966 
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Chapter 3 
Macroeconomic Impacts of Oil Prices and Underlying Financial 
Shocks 
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3.1 Introduction 
Large fluctuations in oil prices and their high volatility have long been sources of 
instability in the global economy. In particular, the sharp rise in oil prices during the 
commodity boom that started in the early 2000s posed serious challenges to 
macroeconomic management in both developed and developing countries. Against this 
background, a large body of literature has empirically examined the underlying causes 
of oil price fluctuations and their macroeconomic impacts. Early research mainly 
focuses on the relationships between oil prices and economic activity (see, for example, 
Hamilton,1983; Hooker,1996), finding a strong negative relation between rising oil 
prices and GDP growth in many countries. Previous studies also suggest a positive 
association between rising oil prices and inflationary pressures on the economy (see, for 
example, Cunado and Perez de Gracia, 2005). 
Further, while a growing body of literature examines the effect of oil prices on the 
stock market, there is no robust consensus about the effect of oil price shocks on stock 
market returns. Ciner (2001) finds that a statistically significant relationship exists 
between oil price futures and real stock returns, but that the correlation is non-linear. 
Similarly, Aloui et al. (2008) find that changes in oil prices significantly increase the 
volatility of stock market returns in six developed countries. By contrast, Jammazi and 
Aloui (2010) show that oil price shocks do not affect stock market returns during 
recession phases.
20
 
Recent studies have shown that the effects of oil price shocks on stock markets 
depend on whether the country is an oil importer or an oil exporter. For example, Park 
and Ratti (2008) show that oil price shocks account for a statistically significant 6% of 
the volatility in real stock returns. Moreover, the increased volatility of oil prices 
significantly depresses real stock returns in many European oil-importing countries. 
Arouri and Rault (2012), on the other hand, report that oil price increases positively 
influence stock prices in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, except in Saudi Arabia. 
Despite the accumulation of empirical evidence, however, two major deficiencies 
are evident in the traditional approach to modeling oil price shocks frequently used in 
the literature. First, although reverse causality may run from real economic activities to 
oil prices, oil price shocks are assumed to be exogenous. Second, the recent literature 
presents evidence that the relation between oil prices and stock prices depends on the 
origin or nature of oil price shocks (see, for example, Ciner, 2013; Degiannakis et al., 
                                                 
20
 Similar findings are reported in Huang et al. (1996) and Cong et al. (2008). 
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2013). These results indicate that the macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks could 
depend on the underlying causes, which has not been fully taken into account in 
previous analyses. 
Kilian (2009) proposes a two-step approach to analyzing the macroeconomic 
impacts of oil price shocks in order to overcome these shortcomings. In the first step, a 
vector autoregression (VAR) that includes oil production, global economic activity, and 
oil prices as endogenous variables is estimated in order to identify three types of 
structural shocks that underlie oil price changes: an oil supply shock, an aggregate 
demand shock, and an oil market-specific demand shock that reflects an unexpected 
change in precautionary oil demand. In the second step, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions are estimated to evaluate the impact of the identified structural shocks on 
the macroeconomic indicators. Kilian (2009) adopts this framework to demonstrate that 
US macroeconomic indicators respond differently to oil price shocks depending on the 
types of underlying shocks. 
Kilian‘s (2009) two-step approach has been employed extensively by recent studies 
of how oil price shocks influence real economic activity and the stock markets. For 
instance, it has been shown that the consideration of the origins of oil price shocks is 
crucial, since different shocks in the crude oil market have diverse effects on real 
activity and stock markets (see, among others, Kilian and Park, 2009; Apergis and 
Miller, 2009; Yoshizaki and Hamori, 2013). However, to our best knowledge, no authors 
have yet attempted to extend Kilian‘s (2009) framework in order to identify an 
exogenous shock that arises from unexpected changes in financial market conditions 
and examine the consequent macroeconomic impacts of oil price changes. This 
extension must be meaningful because there is emerging evidence of the so-called 
financialization of commodity markets, a phenomenon characterized by a high degree of 
price correlation among a broad set of commodities as well as between commodities 
and financial assets, presumably due to the greater participation of financial investors in 
commodity markets (Henderson et al., 2012; Nissanke, 2012; Singelton, 2012; Tang and 
Xiong, 2012; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2012; Morana, 2013; Basak and Pavlova, 2013). A 
consequence of the financialization process is that commodity prices such as oil prices 
are determined not only by their supply and demand but also by the financial market 
conditions that affect financial investment. 
The financial collapse of 2008 has sparked renewed interest in the accurate 
measurement of financial shocks to the real economy. In this context, many researchers 
have developed methods for constructing financial condition indexes, which contain 
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information on financial variables selected not only from stock markets but also from 
bond market sand the banking system. This approach is necessary because individual 
indicators (e.g., those only derived from stock markets) may provide ambiguous signals 
if financial conditions do not change simultaneously or uniformly. In this paper, we use 
the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) developed by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City as a proxy for global financial market conditions. The KCFSI is a 
composite index designed to measure the level of stress in US financial markets. It 
includes 11 financial variables such as TED spread, Treasury and corporate bond 
spreads, and the volatility of stock prices.
 
By assuming that US financial market 
conditions reflect, to a significant degree, the overall conditions in global financial 
markets, the KCFSI provides a reasonable measure of stress in global financial markets. 
It has previously been demonstrated that an increase in financial stress is associated 
with higher financing costs, greater economic uncertainty, and increased risk premiums, 
resulting in depressed corporate investment and household spending and declining real 
economic activity (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009; Davig and Hakkio, 2010). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 identifies those 
structural shocks that underlie oil price changes by estimating a structural VAR; Section 
3.3 examines the impact of the identified structural shocks on the macroeconomic 
indicators in five major industrial countries, namely France, Germany, Japan, the UK, 
and the US; and Section 3.4 presents the summary and conclusions. 
3.2 Structural Shocks that Underlie Oil Price Changes 
3.2.1 Structural VAR model 
In this section, we identify the structural shocks that underlie oil price changes by 
estimating a VAR model. The structural representation of the VAR model is as follows: 
 
0 1
p
t i t i ti
A y A y                     (3.1) 
 
where ty is a (4×1) vector that contains global crude oil production (COP), global real 
economic activity (REA), real oil prices (ROP), and the KCFSI, 0A denotes a 
contemporaneous coefficient matrix,  denotes a vector of constant terms, and t
denotes a vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural shocks. Under the 
appropriate identifying restrictions, structural shocks can be recovered from the 
estimated reduced-form errors by using the following relationship: 
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where 
te  denotes the reduced-form errors. 
COP is measured by using the total world crude oil production provided by the Oil 
and Gas Journal. REA is measured by using the index developed by Kilian (2009).
21
 
This index is constructed by using single-voyage freight rates for bulk dry commodity 
cargoes. It is then deflated by the US consumer price index and linearly de-trended in 
order to remove the effects of technological advances in shipbuilding and other 
long-term trends in demand for seatransport. ROP is measured by using the US West 
Texas Intermediate price deflated by the US producer price index. The data source is the 
IMF‘s International Financial Statistics. Finally, as discussed in Section 3.1, we use the 
KCFSI as a proxy for global financial market conditions. The KCFSI is normalized to 
have a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one. A positive (negative) value 
indicates that financial stress is above (below) the long-run average, which would 
discourage (encourage) financial investment in oil markets. 
A VAR is estimated by using the log-difference of COP and ROP and the levels of 
the KCFSI and REA divided by 100.
22
 The sample period runs from January 1991 to 
December 2012. In line with the approach taken by Kilian (2009), VAR model is 
estimated by using 24 lags of each variable to allow for the potentially long-run effects 
of structural oil price shocks on the economy.
23
 We then identify structural shocks by 
using the Choleski decomposition, with the order being COP, REA, ROP, and the 
KCFSI. This order determines the exogeneity of the variables; a shock on a particular 
variable has a contemporaneous effect on the variables ordered after that particular 
variable but not before it. Following Kilian (2009), COP is assumed to be least 
responsive presumably due to the high adjustment costs of oil production, followed by 
REA and ROP. By adopting this ordering, we assume that the oil supply shock, 
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 The data for the index are available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/. 
22
 According to the augmented Dickey–Fuller test, all transformed variables are stationary at the 5% 
significance level except the transformed REA. However, the DF-GLS test indicates that the 
transformed REA is stationary at the 5% significance level. We therefore assume that all transformed 
variables are stationary in the analysis presented herein. We also checked that the stability condition 
of a VAR, which requires all characteristic roots to lie within the unit circle, is met. 
23
 The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) indicates a lag length of 6. The estimation results based 
on 6 lags are similar to those based on 24 lags. 
 
46 
 
aggregate demand shock, and oil-specific demand shock can be captured by using the 
structural shock to COP, REA, and ROP, respectively. The KCFSI is placed after ROP 
based on the assumption that oil prices have contemporaneous effects on financial 
markets but not vice versa.
24
 This assumption is in line with the existing literature. For 
example, Kilian and Park (2009) employ a VAR model and investigate stock market 
fluctuations associated with oil price shocks with the ordering of oil production, real 
economic activity real oil prices, and real stock returns. Basher et al. (2012) estimate a 
structural VAR model in order to investigate the dynamic relationship between oil prices, 
exchange rates, and emerging market stock prices, imposing the restriction that the 
interest rate spread (TED spread) is allowed to react contemporaneously to oil prices, 
but not vice versa. In the same vein, Kang and Ratti (2013) examine the relationship 
between oil shocks, economic policy uncertainty, and stock prices by estimating a 
structural VAR with the ordering of oil production, real economic activity, real oil prices, 
a proxy variable for economic policy uncertainty, and real stock returns. Kilian and 
Vega (2011) show that oil prices do not respond contemporaneously to domestic 
macroeconomic news, which is consistent with the commonly used identifying 
assumption that oil price shocks are predetermined with respect to domestic 
macroeconomic aggregates. Hence, the reduced-form VAR is obtained by multiplying 
both sides of Eq. (3.1) by 
1
0A

, which has the following recursive structure: 
1
2 21
3 31 32
4 41 42 43
1 0 0 0
1 0 0
1 0
1
oil supply sht
aggregate demand shockt
oil specific demand shockt
financia
ock
l shockt
u
u a
u a a
u a a a





   
   
    
 
 
 
 
  

 

 
   
   
 
3.2.2 Impulse Response to Structural Shocks 
To illustrate the relative importance of the identified structural shocks as sources of oil 
price changes, the cumulative impulse responses of ROP and other variables to a 
one-standard deviation shock are shown in Figure 3.1. The dotted lines represent 
two-standard error bands. 
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 The results of the impulse response analyses are similar irrespective of whether the KCFSI is 
placed before REA or before ROP. 
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 Fig. 3.1. Accumulated Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations with Two-Standard Error 
Confidence Bands. Note: The dotted lines represent two-standard error bands. 
 
Figure 3.1 highlights thatthe effect of an unexpected increase in oil supply on ROP is 
small and statistically insignificant. By contrast, an unexpected increase in aggregate 
demand causes a statistically significant increase in ROP, which peaks after 
approximately six months. An unexpected increase in oil market-specific demand has an 
immediate and relatively large positive impact on ROP, which is persistent and 
statistically significant. These results are broadly consistent with those of Kilian (2009). 
The impulse response of ROP to a financial shock is of particular interest herein. 
The figure indicates that ROP declines in the face of a positive financial shock, which 
implies worsening financial market conditions. Such an unexpected worsening of 
financial conditions causes a statistically significant decline in ROP, which bottoms out 
after approximately five months. We also find that a positive financial shock depresses 
real activity.
25
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This result is consistent with the findings of Basher et al. (2012). They employ a structural VAR to 
model the dynamic relationshipsamong oil supply, REA, emerging stock market prices, TED spread, 
the exchange rate index for major currencies, and real oil prices. The empirical results show that 
credit tightening, measured by an increase in TED spread, tends to depress real oil prices, REA, and 
emerging stock market prices. 
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The findings presented in this section indicate that a financial shock is an important 
determinant of oil prices. This result seems to lend some support to the view that oil 
markets have become financialized in the sense that oil prices are significantly driven 
by changes in financial market conditions that affect financial investment. 
3.2.3 Variance Decomposition 
In this section, we investigate the contribution of different structural shocks to the 
fluctuations of the variables in the VAR by estimating the forecast error variance 
decomposition. Table 3.1 shows the share of the fluctuations in ROP and the KCFSI 
caused by its own shocks (the oil-specific demand shock and financial shock, 
respectively) compared with the shocks to the other variables. 
A major share of ROP fluctuations is accounted for by its own shock (i.e., 
oil-specific demand shock), although the contribution of this shock declines over time. 
We note that the financial shock accounts for a larger share of ROP fluctuations than the 
demand shock after 3 months and thereafter. The financial shock explains 
approximately 15% of ROP fluctuations, while the demand shock accounts for just 10% 
after 12 months. On the other hand, the oil supply shock accounts for the lowest share 
of ROP fluctuations (5%), which could be seen as an indication of its low explanatory 
power. These results are broadly similar to the findings for the impulse responses 
analysis presented above. 
The fluctuations in the KCFSI are mostly caused by its own shock (i.e., financial 
shock) at all time horizons. The combined contribution of the other shocks to KCFSI 
fluctuations accounts for approximately 18% after 12 months. Interestingly, we find that 
the share of KCFSI fluctuations caused by other shocks varies considerably over time. 
For example, the aggregate demand shock accounts for a larger share of KCFSI 
fluctuations than the oil supply shock before 8 months. However, the oil supply shock 
accounts for a larger share of KCFSI fluctuations than the aggregate demand shock 
thereafter. We also find that the oil-specific demand shock accounts for approximately 3% 
of KCFSI fluctuations throughout the study period, which is constantly lower than the 
demand shock. 
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Table 3.1 Variance Decomposition 
 Variance Decomposition of  ROP 
Period 
Oil Supply 
Shock 
Aggregate 
Demand 
Shock 
Oil-Specific 
Demand 
Shock 
Financial 
Shock 
1 0.416744  4.253206  95.33005  0.000000  
 
(1.01472) (2.69691) (2.81577) (0.00000) 
2 1.160561  7.290005  88.94507  2.604366  
 
(1.79303) (3.77865) (4.51010) (2.47888) 
3 1.052779  9.280690  78.60043  11.06610  
 
(1.77647) (4.26891) (5.82840) (4.78827) 
4 1.052130  9.338240  78.42302  11.18661  
 
(1.95673) (4.32213) (5.89882) (4.81225) 
5 1.958448  9.809393  76.30111  11.93105  
 
(2.50535) (4.41874) (6.03069) (4.87145) 
6 2.016218  9.732950  75.73076  12.52008  
 
(2.64949) (4.39945) (5.95444) (4.84863) 
7 2.754364  9.594950  74.51508  13.13561  
 
(2.98655) (4.32580) (5.94196) (4.91509) 
8 3.426793  9.535156  73.58442  13.45363  
 
(3.31214) (4.32541) (6.03936) (4.93794) 
9 4.907015  9.199454  70.75708  15.13645  
 
(3.82581) (4.32022) (6.16794) (5.27097) 
10 5.718270  9.550469  69.41746  15.31380  
 
(4.09624) (4.42895) (6.08238) (5.05673) 
11 6.634490  9.678430  68.51071  15.17637  
 
(4.31871) (4.37782) (6.03151) (5.02295) 
12 7.022894  10.20350  67.63761  15.13600  
 
(4.39053) (4.45174) (5.99786) (4.90906) 
     
     
 Variance Decomposition of  KCFSI 
  
Period 
Oil Supply 
Shock 
Aggregate 
Demand 
Shock 
Oil-Specific 
Demand 
Shock 
Financial 
Shock 
1 0.141737  5.336829  3.353950  91.16748  
 
(0.77823) (2.80845) (2.29265) (3.56965) 
2 0.530050  6.656845  2.761399  90.05171  
 
(1.46804) (3.80057) (2.55255) (4.65829) 
3 1.491088  6.659810  2.868996  88.98011  
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(2.46534) (4.47458) (3.16113) (5.72175) 
4 3.645055  6.522759  3.183499  86.64869  
 
(3.76431) (4.97906) (3.68485) (6.65331) 
5 4.557677  8.026319  2.662871  84.75313  
 
(4.59902) (5.99462) (3.65944) (7.66033) 
6 5.199939  7.984419  2.348945  84.46670  
 
(5.39784) (6.48512) (3.32788) (8.30988) 
7 6.056162  7.544395  2.409160  83.99028  
 
(6.17774) (6.59809) (3.07808) (8.81112) 
8 6.682029  7.025904  2.692125  83.59994  
 
(6.87982) (6.61468) (3.28161) (9.30681) 
9 7.157214  6.736560  3.113042  82.99318  
 
(7.48462) (6.63824) (3.85629) (9.82989) 
10 7.388232  6.483358  3.116752  83.01166  
 
(7.89428) (6.51613) (4.21229) (10.1276) 
11 8.094858  6.296603  3.052101  82.55644  
 
(8.45574) (6.39416) (4.48203) (10.4587) 
12 8.457265  6.133896  3.129012  82.27983  
 
(8.80301) (6.37147) (4.82835) (10.7651) 
Note: The values in parentheses represent the t-statistics when 
coefficients' standard errors were generated  from a Monte-Carlo 
simulation with 1000 replications. 
 
3.3 Macroeconomic Impacts of Structural Shocks 
3.3.1 OLS Regressions 
In this section, we examine the impact of the identified structural shocks on the 
macroeconomic indicators by estimating OLS regressions.
26
 The explanatory variables 
are the four structural shocks identified in Section 3.2, which are standardized by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The dependent variables 
are the following three macroeconomic indicators: the index of industrial production 
(IIP), consumer price index (CPI), and stock price index (STP).
27
An OLS regression is 
                                                 
26
Alternatively, we can use a finite distributed lag model such as an Almon lag model in order to 
avoid potential multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in an OLS regression. However, 
the variance inflation factor is less than two in all the estimated OLS regressions, indicating that the 
degree of multicollinearity is low. We therefore use the results of OLS regressions in the presented 
analysis. 
27
All the data for IIP and CPI are seasonally adjusted. STP is converted into the real value by 
deflating by using CPI. The data source is the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics. 
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estimated for each of these macroeconomic indicators by using quarterly data from 
1993Q1 to 2012Q4.
28
 The sample includes data for France, Germany, Japan, the UK, 
and the US. Following Kilian (2009), measures of quarterly shocks are constructed by 
averaging monthly shocks for each quarter: 
3
, ,
1
1ˆ ˆ          1,2,3,4
3
jt j t i
i
j 

   
where ˆ
jt denotes the j th structural shock in the t th quarter and , ,ˆ j t i denotes the 
estimated j th structural shock in the i th month of the t th quarter. 
The effects of the estimated structural shocks on the macroeconomic indicators are 
examined by estimating the following regressions: 
12
0
12
0
12
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    
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

 
where ∆ denotes the percentage change in the relevant variables, j , j , and j are 
constant terms, ji , ji , and jt are the impulse response coefficients at horizon i, and 
jtr , jtv , and jts are error terms. The maximum lag is determined by the maximum 
horizon of the impulse function, which is set to 12 quarters. Since there is a potential 
problem of serial correlation in the error terms, the block bootstrap method is used to 
infer the estimated coefficients. Specifically, we use an overlapping moving block 
bootstrap method with block size 4 and 20,000 bootstrap replications.
29
 
3.3.2 Estimation Results 
The cumulative impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to the structural 
shocks are shown in Figure 3.2. The dotted and dashed lines represent one-standard 
error and two-standard error bands, respectively. In the discussion below, the statistical 
significance is determined based on one-standard error bands. 
                                                 
28
 The start date of 1993 reflects the need to accommodate lags in the VAR. 
29
 See MacKinnon (2006) for a survey of bootstrapping methods. 
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[France] 
 
Note: The dotted and dashed lines represent one-standard and two-standard error bands, respectively. 
 
[Germany] 
 
Note: The dotted and dashed lines represent one-standard and two-standard error bands, respectively. 
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[Japan] 
 
Note: The dotted and dashed lines represent one-standard and two-standard error bands, respectively. 
 
[UK] 
 
Note: The dotted and dashed lines represent one-standard and two-standard error bands, respectively. 
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[US] 
 
Note: The dotted and dashed lines represent one-standard and two-standard error bands, respectively. 
Figure 3.2 Cumulative Responses of the Macroeconomic Indicators to the Structural Shocks 
 
A positive oil supply shock (an unexpected increase in oil supply) causes a sustained 
and statistically significant increase in IIP only in the US. The effects of an oil supply 
shock on CPI are statistically insignificant in all countries.
30
 By contrast, a positive oil 
supply shock leads to a statistically significant increase in STP in all countries except 
Japan. The corresponding responses in STP are statistically significant for all or almost 
all horizons in France and the UK. Likewise, the corresponding responses in STP are 
positive in Germany and the US, although they are statistically significant only after the 
second year. 
A positive aggregate demand shock (an unexpected increase in aggregate demand) 
causes an increase in IIP in all countries in the first year. In particular, the positive 
response of IIP is highly statistically significant based on two-standard error bands in 
France and Japan. However, these cumulative responses peak in the second half of the 
first year, followed by a statistically insignificant decline towards or below the initial 
level in the third year. The result is fully consistent with one of the key findings of 
Kilian (2009). The corresponding response of STP follows a similar pattern, except in 
Japan. These results indicate that the initial direct effect of the aggregate demand shock 
on IIP and STP wears off over time, which is offset almost fully or more than fully by 
the shock‘s lagged indirect effect through oil price changes. Moreover, a positive 
aggregate demand shock causes a statistically significant increase in CPI in France and 
the US in the first year. 
                                                 
30
 The effect of the oil supply shock on CPI is similar to that found by Kilian (2009). 
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A positive oil market-specific demand shock (an unexpected increase in 
precautionary oil demand) causes a temporary and statistically significant increase in IIP 
only in European countries. In the US and Japan, the corresponding responses are 
statistically insignificant. A positive oil market-specific demand shock causes a 
statistically significant increase in CPI in France, Germany, and the US. By contrast, the 
shock does not cause a statistically significant increase in STP in all countries. This 
result is consistent with that of Degiannak is et al. (2013), which find that the 
precautionary demand oil price shock has no significant impact on the stock returns of 
European industrial sectors. 
The impulse responses of the macroeconomic indicators to financial shocks are of 
particular interest in this paper. As expected, a positive financial shock (an unexpected 
increase in the KCFSI, implying increased stress in financial markets) causes a highly 
statistically significant decline in IIP in all countries. This finding indicates that as 
financial stress rises, increased financing costs and greater uncertainty depress REA.
31
 
These cumulative responses of IIP bottom out after the second year, followed by a 
statistically insignificant increase. However, the response remains negative in the 
following period. A similar response pattern is observed for STP. These results indicate 
that, unlike the aggregate demand shock, the initial impact of the financial shock is 
sustained presumably due to weaker offsetting indirect effects through oil price changes. 
There is also a noticeable difference in the associated response pattern between the 
aggregate demand shock and financial shock, illustrating the importance of identifying 
the latter shock as an additional source of oil price fluctuations. Finally, a positive 
financial shock causes a statistically significant decline in CPI in the US. 
The findings presented above can be summarized as follows. First, we find evidence 
that the macroeconomic impact of oil price shocks depends on the underlying causes 
and that each shock is associated with a distinct response pattern, which is fully 
consistent with the results in the literature, notably those of Kilian (2009). Second, we 
advance our understanding of the relation between oil price shocks and stock prices. 
More specifically, we find that the impact of oil supply shock on stock prices is more 
persistent, whereas the net effect of the aggregate demand shock on stock price changes 
over time. This result is broadly in line with the findings of Ciner (2013) and Degiannak 
et al. (2013), which show that the relation between oil prices and stock prices depends 
on the origin or nature of oil price shocks. Finally, we find that the macroeconomic 
                                                 
31
 The result is consistent with the finding presented in Figure 3.1, which shows that a positive 
financial shock causes a negative and statistically significant effect on REA. 
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impact of the financial shock is significant and thus comparable with that of the 
aggregate demand shock. Moreover, we find a noticeable difference in the associated 
response pattern between the aggregate demand shock and financial shock, illustrating 
the importance of identifying the latter shock as an additional source of oil price 
fluctuations. 
3.4 Conclusions 
We extend Kilian‘s (2009) framework to identify an exogenous shock that arises from 
an unexpected change in financial market conditions and examine the consequent 
macroeconomic impacts of oil price changes. This extension is meaningful because 
there is emerging evidence of the financialization of commodity markets, a phenomenon 
characterized by a high degree of price correlation among a broad set of commodities as 
well as between commodities and financial assets presumably due to the greater 
participation of financial investors in commodity markets. 
By applying Kilian‘s (2009) method, we identify a structural financial shock that 
causes changes in oil prices, assess the relative importance of a financial shock as a 
source of oil price changes, and examine its macroeconomic impacts. In the first step, 
we identify four types of structural shocks, including the financial shock, by estimating 
a VAR. The impulse response analysis shows that a positive financial shock causes a 
statistically significant decline in oil prices, indicating that the financial shock is a key 
determinant of oil prices. Moreover, the estimated variance decomposition indicates that 
the financial shock has a relatively high explanatory power for oil price fluctuations. In 
the second step, we examine the impact of underlying structural shocks on the 
macroeconomic indicators in five major industrial countries. The impulse response 
analysis indicates that the macroeconomic impact of the financial shock is significant 
and that the importance of financial shocks as sources of macroeconomic fluctuations is 
comparable with that of the aggregate demand shock. This paper also furthers the 
understanding of the relation between oil price shocks and stock prices by showing that 
the impact of the oil supply shock on stock prices is more persistent, whereas the net 
effect of the aggregate demand shock on stock price changes over time. 
The key policy implications derived from our analysis can be summarized as 
follows. First, policymakers must explicitly take account of changes in global financial 
market conditions when analyzing the macroeconomic impacts of oil price shocks. 
Second, the design of a stabilization policy in response to oil price shocks must be 
tailored in accordance with the underlying causes because different underlying shocks 
57 
 
could have different macroeconomic impacts in different countries. Finally, a 
stabilization policy is required to be forward-looking because the net effect of 
underlying shocks, such as aggregate demand shocks and financial shocks, could differ 
and change significantly over time. 
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